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The role of corporate America and U.S. investment bankers in the engineering of a 
“Turbo- or Super- Capitalism” incompatible with CSR or Sustainable Development [1] 
 
 
In the United States of America, the "Progressive Period" stretching from the 1890s to the 1920s 
saw the adoption, by many large stock-listed firms, of paternalist, then welfare capitalist 
managerial solutions [2] which later became ordinary practices in the liberal [3] consensus era 
after the Second World War. Providing their workforce with welfare benefits (health and 
pension plans, etc.) the management of which was nonetheless left to employers' discretion and 
allowing their leadership to escape the straitjacket of labor change imposed by legislative 
action, these firms' managerial choices marked the "privatization of workers' welfare" 
(Abraham Epstein, 1926), the triumph of “welfare capitalism” and the defeat of “welfare 
statism”. 
 
That situation, which, in the United States, allowed welfare capitalism to surpass welfare 
statism at one point, also helped to explain, why and how in this country, the content and 
practices of what would become later "corporate responsibility", was designed as such. Bearing 
the stakeholder model as a beacon of corporate global commitment to the social well-being of 
the nation, it would later enter a collision course with the shareholder model legitimated by the 
monetary and financial deregulation process started by the USA in the 1970s to combat 
stagflation, energy crises and a decrease in U.S corporate competitiveness. Legitimated by 
scores of academic authors calling for the privileging of shareholders' profitability expectations 
over top executives' own vested interests, the shareholder value model rested on the belief that 
by aligning more closely shareholders' interests with those of top firms' executives, the control 
of the former ones over corporate strategy would be stronger and the profitability of stock-listed 
firms would swell automatically, as would the competitiveness of the whole country. 
 
However, as the economic deregulation process increased over the 1980s and the 1990s, the 
succession of always bigger corporate, banking and hedge-funds management scandals 
revealed, simultaneously, the deep flaws of the shareholder model, in a real economics setting 
where tax havens-based financial strategies of global players, shady dealings, shoddy 
supervision practices explained by "the flow of individuals between Wall Street and 
Washington" (Simon Johnson, 2009 [4]) contradicted regularly the dominant discourse on 
transparent and always more efficient market operators submitted to the guidance of an active 
and enlightened "corporate governance".  
 
By the same token, in a post-subprime environment where the lobbying practices [5] of bankers 
and fund managers have been preventing any real implementation of former or new financial 
regulation, the discourse of large stock-listed corporations over their commitment to corporate 




Boosting the “corporate family” in the age of “liberal [6] consensus” 
 
The evolution of corporate mindsets allowed business interests to modify the terms and content 
of the private welfare system with a “new private deal” that they manufactured, following the 
economic restructuring of the late 1980s and early 1990s, under the aegis of globalized finance. 
In that system which privileged costs cutting in order to satisfy shareholders’ profitability 
expectations, employers transferred an ever-increasing portion of benefit expenses (health, 
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pensions, etc.) to employees. Regarding pension plans, that trend saw the decline of “defined 
benefit plans” (DBPs) in which employers participated financially and workers knew exactly 
the amount of money they would be given when retiring, and the rise of “defined contribution 
plans” (DCPs) in which workers contributed the majority – and sometimes all of retirement 
savings – without ever knowing the amount of money they would get for retirement, as the 
latter depended on the stock exchange performances and those of their own companies’ upon 
leaving them. From then on, “Moral Contract Capitalism” was dead and the shortcomings of 
the private welfare system became obvious as whole populations of “reengineered” and 
“rightsized” workers and middle managers – the prime targets of cost-cutting to boost 
profitability – lost job security and the welfare benefits tied up to it. Large stock-owned 
multinational companies, their shareholders, top managers and executives settled into the 
routines of profit maximization and next quarter benefits defined as their corporate compasses’ 
main course for securing rising value and dividends for their shareholders, fattened bonuses and 
increased stock option plans guaranteed by golden parachutes for themselves. 
 
If Corporate Social Responsibility (Act I) was first the marker for welfare capitalist practices 
in large firms providing workers with an assortment of individual benefits (1920- 1960), it lost 
this initial meaning with the advent of financialized globalization. Revisited by “organic 
intellectuals” as a means to soften the rough edges of brutal reengineering plans in the 1980s 
and 1990s, its “Act II” version lost progressively its soul, as it never questioned the logic, nor 
did it question the finalities driving that new kind of capitalism. Building on the former implicit 
postulate of welfare capitalism (widely shared among American CEOs) according to which 
private economic agents' self-regulating policing and mechanisms were preferable to 
government-administered ones, CSR Act II supporters strove to convince the civil society that 
the a-moral (“beyond good or evil”) posture defended by libertarian supporters of a 
financialized economics free of State intervention[7] was compatible with the struggle to 
minimize negative corporate societal externalities while improving the defense of fundamental 
human and labor rights. The result was a huge confusion surrounding the debate on the role of 
economics and business in society, as the succeeding monetary and financial crises since the 
1970s have demonstrated a propensity from major corporate, banking, auditing, and financial 
investment establishments to misbehave when their activities were poorly supervised (as 
existing rules were not applied) [8]. But the confusion went deeper as the systems' faults were 
hidden by a dominant economic paradigm drenched in a libertarian [9] ideology that legitimated 
the belief, among corporate chieftains, that the free expression of the “natural laws of 
economics” were the only laws worth supporting as their scientific and a-ethical content went 
beyond “good or evil issues”, addressing only issues of cold-blooded business rationality which 




Growing opposition to the social legacy of the New Deal 
 
If the 1920s-1930s gave birth to welfare capitalism in large stock-listed American corporations 
and a privatized version of the New Deal in the United States, it also gave birth to what would 
be called a “liberal parenthesis” [10] and a “liberal consensus” that would last until the end of 
the 1960s. That period is very important, as it contributed to validate a specific kind of 
capitalism whose legitimacy rested on its shared support by leading stock- owned businesses, 
political and union circles and its capacity to bear out a specific kind of corporate management 
that privileged stakeholders over shareholders’ interests in large firms. The liberal consensus 
happened in the aftermath of the Great Depression following the financial crash of 1929, then 
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coincided, after WWII, with the United States’ accession to economic and world superpower 
and to the advent and the making of a strong middle class in this country. That liberal 
parenthesis was born with the formerly cited reforms made by Democrat president Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt (FDR) and his “brain trust” in the New Deal (1933-1938). With the New 
Deal, Roosevelt introduced a kind of American version of the “Welfare State [11]” that 
augmented the size and the reach of the Federal State and introduced “Keynesianism” in the 
U.S. economy without endangering the control that large corporations, their leading families 
and executives retained on their workforce, thanks to the integration and practice of welfare 
capitalism. 
 
However, Roosevelt's New Deal measures were considered, from the start, a “heresy” by some 
intellectual, political and business circles that coalesced into what became known as the “Old 
Right” (between the 1930s and the beginning of the 1950s). That intellectual and political trend 
gathered, at the time, all those who worried about the concentration of too much political and 
administrative power in the hands of the Federal State and called for a return to 
“Republicanism” (decentralization, limited government, active checks and balances, respect of 
individual freedom and autonomy) as stated in Thomas Jefferson’s writings [12]. They 
interpreted American political alternative in the following terms: either the United States 
remained a country of limited government protecting individual freedom and initiatives; or it 
chose to submit to an Executive center with exorbitant powers (given to Federal State or giant 
corporations), eager to commit the country to some kind of “collectivism” inside its borders 
and to “imperialism” (through interventionist policies) outside its borders [13]. Very quickly, 
the opponents to FDR’s policies got called “conservatives” as, at the time, their arguments 
seemed to defend a social and economic status-quo associated with policies responsible for the 
financial crisis and the great depression, while FDR’s policies were deemed “progressive” as 
they broke with the past and bore an egalitarian ideal thanks to an interventionist State. For the 
“Old Right” opponents to the New Deal, this was a serious misunderstanding as they argued 
that it was the New Deal policies that were “conservative” for their defense of a kind of 
economic status quo that was favorable to big businesses and their political pull (especially to 
old families and money from the East coast). 
 
Notwithstanding the advent of the “Old Right” as an opponent, though not coherent group to 
FDR’s policies, its supporters were not very successful for economic, political and social 
reasons. First, New Deal policies, despite a recession between 1937 and 1940, were responsible 
for an economic upturn that the World War II American effort confirmed. Military spending 
even allowed supporters of the Roosevelt administration to state that public intervention was a 
good stimulant for economic growth. And progressively, with the social reforms set up by 
FDR’s administration, a general consensus formed within the USA about their relevance. Under 
the label “liberal consensus” or “cold war liberalism” [14], it thwarted the ambitions of Old 
Rightists to impose their vision of a government strictly limited to the defense of private 
property or their plea to abolish the New Deal and its version of an American welfare State, as 
they appeared totally disconnected from the population's expectations. However, the advent of 
the Cold war (1946-1947) gave a new impetus to some ideas of the “Old Right” rejuvenated 
into a “New Right”. At the beginning of the second part of the 20th century, fear of a nuclear 
war and of a global alliance of communist regimes in the world, plus fear of domestic 
communist or socialist destabilization added to that historical inheritance and generated new 






The evolution of corporate and business social mindsets 
 
Despite support from business organizations such as the National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM) or from mid-west and western small and medium firms represented within national and 
local networks of the Chambers of Commerce, American business and intellectual leading 
circles did not approve of conservative, new-rightist’s ideas, that were, then, associated with a 
dangerous extremism. The “Liberal consensus”, comforted by the largely privatized New Deal 
contained in welfare capitalism, still dominated American politics and was favored both in 
Democratic and Republican leading political circles. 
 
As far as corporate America was concerned, Sanford Jacoby quotes a 1956 study of post- war 
business ideology which clearly privileged a “stakeholder philosophy of governance, in which 
shareholders were just one of several groups recognized by managers” [15]. In that creed, top 
corporate managers acknowledged “four broad responsibilities: to consumers, to employees, to 
stockholders and to the general public, [...] each group on an equal footing, the function of 
management [being] to secure justice, for all and unconditional maxima for none [... as] profits 
above a 'fair' level are an economic sin” [16]. The CEOs of large companies made this view 
largely known around them. David Packard, co-founder of Hewlett Packard (HP) during a 
conference he was attending at the end of the 1940s, stated that “business had responsibilities 
beyond making a profit for their shareholders” and, according to him, those responsibilities 
extended to “our employees, to our customers, to our suppliers and to the welfare of society at 
large” [17]. Ralph Cordiner, CEO of General Electric through the late 1950s confirmed that 
stance, arguing that senior executives were responsible for managing the enterprise “in the best-
balanced interests of shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers and plant community cities” 
[18]. As far as business went, that new stakeholder philosophy became a long trend in large 
stock-owned businesses, lasting from the 1950s through the 1970s, a period which, according 
to Sanford Jacoby, was also the “highpoint of corporate social responsibility in the United 
States” [19]. 
 
So, the liberal consensus era, which was also the corporate social responsibility (Act I) era, was 
a time when workers were considered as stakeholders in large stock-owned firms and had “a 
status within the corporate family”. That status meant that employment was considered “a 
quasi-permanent relationship that endured through bad times and good” [20]. Corporate 
management made sure that the workforce were sheltered from risk in a variety of ways as the 
latter were then considered as “investments” rather than “commodities”: through the provision 
of pension and health plans, the smoothing of wages rather than their raising or lowering them 
when business activity peaked or slumped, the avoidance of brutal white or blue-collar layoffs 
followed by rehiring according to business fluctuation, the admittance (albeit reluctant) of 
collective bargaining as legal and social responsibility, the rising share of national income going 
to wages and salaries – all measures which, form the 1950s to the 1970s contributed to the 
advent of a strong middle class and the “contagion of prosperity” within the US. 
 
 
Legitimating the trampling of the Moral Contract 
 
If, as we are going to see, the 1970s global and domestic crisis context contributed, with the 
pull from conservative and libertarian networks [21], to do away with welfare capitalism and the 
New Deal welfare State in the United States, several authors had already, during the liberal 
consensus era, openly questioned the separation of control and stock existing in large 
corporations as, according to them, this could prove to be beneficial to corporate executives but 
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detrimental to corporate performance and to stock holders. Those ideas, which were not popular 
in the “liberal consensus era”, would become, half a century later, the mantra for a new age in 
corporate management. Actually, if the 1930s saw the advent of an “Old Right” as an 
opposition to the intervention of State in economic affairs and to associated formulas of 
welfare capitalism [22], that decade also motivated the first academic questioning of the 
corporate world whose weaknesses had already been made visible with the advent of big groups 
like the 19th century railways companies. 
 
In the early 1930s, Adolphe Bearle and Gardiner Means had thus argued that the separation of 
ownership and control allowed by corporate law in the United States had negative consequences 




That analysis was completed by political theorist James Burnham in a 1941 book where the 
author argued that the power over large corporations was held by an oligarchy of managers 
whose technical skills gave them control over the means of production and motivated them to 
achieve social dominance as a new ruling class [24]. 
 
 […]  
 
“Libertarian economist Milton Friedman added his voice to that intellectual trend. As early as 
1962, he took a firm stance against the Welfare State public intervention in economics and what 
he considered as an excess of taxes and regulations [25]. His advice was sought by Republican 
presidential candidates (ultra-conservative Barry Goldwater in 1964, Richard Nixon in 1968 
and Ronald Reagan in 1980) and he expressed his ideas regularly in an economic chronicle of 




The global context of the 1970s paved the way to a new form of capitalism legitimated partly, 
by the above-mentioned ideas. Context and concepts drove, then, the financialized globalization 
process of the 1980s and a complete change in management practices that did away with welfare 
capitalism and corporate social responsibility (CSR) as the latter had existed until then. 
Actually, that decade saw a combination of domestic and international shocks that led US 
political and economic elites and successive administrations towards new ideas (and policies) 
regarding Economics, the role of State and that of private economic agents. These ideas 
justified the superiority of the private sector and initiatives over public ones, an unrestrained 
and self-regulating economics and finance, and their agents (multinational companies and 
banks, investment funds, etc.) as natural prosperity contributors, State and the administration 
as facilitators to private economic expansion. 
 
 
Dumping the corporate family in the age of “Turbo- or Super-Capitalism” 
 
The 1970s were a decade of crises for capitalist economies and their leading American 
superpower. A crisis, first, of the US industrial system that saw a fall in businesses’ profit rates 
due, partly, to the stagnation of companies’ productivity gains and a rise in employers’ 
contributions. A crisis, secondly, of the international monetary system starting in 1971 and 
seeing its deregulation with the Jamaica agreements of 1976 and motivated by divergent 
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readings and much arms wrestling between its main contenders: with American producers and 
the US government complaining that “American workers were being priced out of jobs because 
the yen and D-mark were being held at artificially low levels” [26], while “the Europeans and 
the Japanese argued that the U.S. was exporting inflation to the rest of the world and abusing 
the international monetary system in order to sustain their military adventurism (at that time in 
Vietnam)”. The period, which, on the economic side, saw thus a combination of stagnation and 
inflation (“stagflation”), also produced high levels of unemployment, a situation that was 
further aggravated by the third main crisis, an “energy crisis” born of two oil shocks (1973 and 
1979). In order to meet the challenges born of that difficult context, and as a complement to the 
above-mentioned monetary measures, the American government made important financial 
decisions which allowed it to keep the dollar as the key IMS currency without having to take 
radical measures to correct their balance of payments deficit. These decisions were to impact 
directly the management of large US firms and transform labor relations. It opened the gate to 




The impact of financial deregulation on corporate policies 
 
Actually, through the 1970s (from 1974 to 1978), the United States started a financial 
deregulation process that put an end to exchange controls and capital movements. Thanks to 
those measures – which were also designed to finance growth without resorting to punishing 
tax raises – international savings, through the channels of foreign investment funds and banks 
could purchase public and private American bonds and shares, transforming both the 
short/medium/long term financing of US federal and local governments, together with large 
stock owned corporations and banks, while giving them the possibility to find the necessary 
resources for their budgets, expansion, world competitiveness and attractiveness. At the same 
time, the managers of public and private U.S. pension funds, whose outfits were flushed with 
reserves from years of corporate employees or civil servants’ long-term savings under the 
welfare capitalist regime, replaced households as bond and stock purchasers, buying 
aggressively into the debt of local and national governments and the equity of large 
corporations, becoming actors to be reckoned with. The same investors started to pull weight 
on corporate management, asking them higher returns (dividends and stock value growth) on 
the money they invested in large firms' equity. With growing mutual funds [28] and large 
insurance companies, those institutional investors, joined by foreign investors, put always more 
pressure on corporate executives, demanding that the latter stop being too complacent and 
squeeze more value out of corporate assets, concentrating on core activities rather than 
acquiring companies in unrelated sectors where they had no particular competence, laying off 
the workforce in unprofitable areas when necessary and repurchasing their business' shares 
(downsizing) in order to augment mechanically their value (rather than reinvesting it in 
potentially longer-term development or raising salaries). Adding to the pressure put by foreign 
investors, corporate executives were soon embattled and obliged to satisfy their always 
demanding investment partners in a new kind of partnership that turned out to offer them 
unheard-of bounty. 
 
As a matter of fact, the landscape of corporate finance changed dramatically between the 1950s 
and the 1980s. Whereas in the early 1950s, “institutional investors held less than 10 percent of 
shares, by the early 1980s this had risen to almost 45 percent” [29]. In their investment practices, 
they differed from household investors in two ways: “First, they owned or managed significant 
chunks of a corporation, not enough to give them outright control, although sometimes this 
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could be achieved through alliances with other institutional investors. Second, because their 
holdings were so large that they were illiquid, meaning that institutional investors were likely 
to use 'voice' (pressuring corporate executives) and not only exit (selling their holdings) when 
dissatisfied with a company's performance” [30]. Together with the weighing in of institutional 
investors who expected to exert their prerogatives as shareholders' representatives, the 
shareholder value revolution meant that from now on, stock prices and dividends would become 
the crucial indexes to assess corporate managers’ efforts. Investment bankers very rapidly saw 
the advantages they could draw out of this new situation and mobilized their creativity to make 
the most of the new deregulated US financial setting (the trend would never stop from then on). 
Observing that, in order to raise their profits and secure constant growth, corporations had to 
compete on already mature markets, the same bankers deduced that the fastest way to make it 
was through external growth which meant buying competitors or merging with them. 
 
 
New management rules under the pressure of leverage buyouts 
 
“Bootstraps” soon rechristened “leveraged buyouts (LBO)” were the new concepts that Jerome 
Kohlberg and George Roberts, two investment bankers from Bear Stearns manufactured [31] in 
order to make those buyouts or mergers happen, while making them also highly profitable for 
corporate raiders, interested investors and for those (investment banks and bankers) 
underwriting them. Their creative concepts were not without consequences for involved 
corporations (especially those that were purchased that way) and the management of their 
workforce and operations. Actually, the LBO concept meant that the buyouts' or mergers' 
expenses of a corporate target [32], whatever their high costs, would be financed by "a mixture 
of a little bit of equity supplied by the purchasers and a lot of debt supplied by banks and 
insurance companies [33]". And so, as Terrence Deal and Allan Kennedy interestingly pointed 
out, “it was the debt that provided the transactions' decisive leverage”. However, as the secured 
debt rested on the assets of the target company (and not on the credit status of the purchaser), it 
was usually made of high-yield securities of substandard investment grade quality. 
 
The “junk bonds”, as this type of security was quickly referred to, got very popular in the U.S. 
and in some measure, in Europe, during the 1980s and until the mid-1990s when they 
experienced a slowdown due to a credit crunch situation and highly visible failures among 
LBOs. As a matter of fact, the top management of target corporations very quickly realized how 
profitable these operations could be for their own benefit. Until the 1970s, top managers, in 
large corporations had satisfied themselves with high salaries and when they earned it, cash 
bonuses. Now, with the financial innovations unleashed by the deregulation of financial 
markets, they understood that the latter could be factors of unheard-of bounty and were mostly 
depending on the satisfaction of institutional investors driven by a recurring mantra: the 
maximization of shareholder value. That realization sharply drew a steep divide between the 
interests of management and that of the workforce as well as did away with the welfare 
preoccupation of top corporate executives and their associated interpretation of CSR. Actually, 
LBOs promoters directly involved targeted corporations' top management in their schemes. For 
their insiders’ knowledge, the latter were offered a hefty stake in the equity of the recapitalized 
company (usually a substantial 20 per cent [34]) which motivated them to undertake a series of 
restructuring plans meant, over a few years, to increase its overall profitability and allow 
investors to resell the company to public investors or to other businesses. The ensuing initiated 
massive cost-reduction operations were usually not “workforce-friendly”: they were “selling-
off unprofitable divisions to raise cash and cut debt, changing approaches to distribution to 
improve the margins on surviving businesses (e.g. getting rid of direct company-paid sales 
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forces and turning distribution over to agents), or often just raising prices to improve 
margins”[35]. 
 
LBOs became thus very attractive both for their initiators and benefiters: bankers, firstly, or 
corporate raider firms’ who packaged the deals usually against high fees; secondly, commercial 
bankers selling the associated junk-bonds; thirdly, insurance and finance companies, mutual 
and pension funds buying the high-yield securities; fourthly, the target companies’ top 
management who did not hesitate to approach investment banks (Bear Stearns or Drexel 
Burnham Lambert) or corporate raiders (Carl Icahn or T. Boone Pickens) or investment groups 
(KKR [36]) to manufacture profitable LBOs. Despite onerous fees charged by LBO 
manufacturers, investors put up with their terms. “Profit” perspectives made LBOs so much 
attractive, with annual returns for investors ranging within a fork between 20 and 30 per cent, 
even reaching 41.8 per cent for a fund in 1982. “Compared with single-digit returns from 
straightforward investments in stocks or bonds, these double-digit returns obviously caught the 
eyes of investors” [37]. But they also changed the rules of the corporate investment game, what 
with all the money and the variety of players eager to make the best deals. As a matter of fact, 
the era of “friendly takeovers” – an era when retaining a committed management team was an 
essential part of the deal – soon gave way to another tune, when, in 1985, KKR launched a 
“hostile takeover bid” for a publicly listed company. “Aggressiveness” became the new name 
for a game where the largest blue chips companies could become potential targets for corporate 
raiders: “Hostile acquisitions, rare before the 1980s became increasingly common, in part 
because institutional investors provided the margin of shares necessary to effectuate a takeover. 
Raiders made money by selling off parts of the company – stripping a conglomerate of its assets 
and also by loading companies with debt (including junk bonds) which conferred enormous tax 
advantages. The remaining company was left more focused but also less stable and riskier” [38].  
 
And when LBO activity slowed dramatically at the end of the 1990s as the level of stock prices 
were so high, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), initially fueled by LBOs and the schemes of 
LBO wizards, became the new fad for major short-term managers [39], banking and Wall Street 
operators. For top executives, the risks of seeing their companies become the victim of hostile 
acquisitions without their being part of the deal, or the necessity to manage always more 
profitably their “taken-over” or merged corporations, in order to pay back the latter debts while 
satisfying their demanding and vocal shareholders, gave way to new priorities and management 
practices. Academia and institutional investors provided the keys to deal efficiently with these 
issues. Actually, preceding literature had, for at least half a century started to challenge the 
power that top executives from large corporations had accumulated in a way that was 
considered detrimental to the interests of shareholders and to those of society at large. With 
giant institutional investors now able to be heard within shareholders assemblies and corporate 
boardrooms, it was then largely believed that, thanks to the attribution of bonuses and stock 
options, plus the negotiations of golden parachutes for CEOs, fund managers would, in the logic 
of “corporate governance”, exert a tighter control over top corporate executives. Despite the 
fact that this control remained utterly theoretical – what with the fact that “borderline” (and also 
cross border) fiscal optimization strategies from tax havens-based multinational or transnational 
corporations' subsidiaries were achieved in total secrecy [40], what with the fact that, as 
institutional investors spread money in a multitude of firms around the world, their fund 
managers could not survey precisely the decisions of top corporate management – a “fairy tale” 
was largely circulated that retired people and employees from large firms were, as well as other 
individual investors, through their pension funds, or the mutual funds they had bought shares 
from, were the real owners and thus active stakeholders and controllers of the most competitive 
US firms. Indirectly therefore employees and retirees could be promoted as “stakeholders” of 
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the reshaped global capitalism and get immediate access to a process of “socialized if not social 
redistribution” of part of its profits, even those achieved through huge plans for redundancies 
for the sake of “financial performance”, competitiveness, and productivity. And that “social 
tale” was sold to the US people, then to the rest of the world throughout the process of financial 
deregulation that was integrated by all the richest countries from the 1970s on. 
 
That “social-financial tale” also suited perfectly well the top U.S. corporate management who 
had first worried that the combination of hostile takeovers and growing power of institutional 
investors would challenge the long-term prerogatives and perks that their privileged situation 
had entitled them with. That anguish did not last long as the tying up of their remuneration with 
financial performance, but also the bonuses, stock-option and golden parachutes that they 
negotiated thanks to the professional counsel of lawyers they could afford, ensured them of 
never sharing the same professional and personal risks (whatever their business results) as their 
employees. “Maximizing shareholder value” and “next quarter results” thus became rapidly the 
cardinal points of publicly traded large companies’ CEOs' strategies and management, as were 
reflected in the financial performances, as well as CEOs’ skyrocketing revenues, in large US 
corporations. “Between 1980 and 1997, the Dow Jones industrial average increased 533 per 
cent […]. The growth in executive pay levels in the 1980s and 1990s was therefore dramatic 
[…]. By 1981, eight figures were becoming more common […]. By the 1990s, however, eight-
figure pay packets were the norm, not the exception. Although it would take a few more years 
before the gray suits would begin to score big points, thanks to these high-earning pioneers, the 
goalposts had been moved and the playing field was open. Michael Eisner (Disney) and Tony 
O'Reilly (Heinz) were the first "managers" (as distinguished from "entrepreneurs") to benefit 
in a very big way.” In 1997, a survey by the New York Times on half of the top 500 publicly-
held companies showed that “fully one in ten of the CEOs surveyed was taking home a pay 
packet worth in excess of $20 million", while the average CEO compensation for the same year 
was $8.7 million, a 37.8 per cent increase over 1996” [41]. Actually, that structural change in 
the financing and governing of large firms also marked the end of welfare capitalism and that 
of CSR in its associated original definition (our “Act I”), as “shareholder value” became the 
cornerstone theme of corporate governance and made “stakeholder value” a relic of the past. 
 
 
The tale of “social finance” v. “social reengineering” 
 
With that new compass, the management of firms got increasingly brutal for the workforce, but 
in the 1980s, with high and persistent unemployment, with unions losing membership and 
political clout, with countries like the American or British whose governments (Reagan and 
Thatcher) had decided to do away with unionization, unorganized employees and the 
unemployed were deprived of bargaining power. Left to their fate in a “Bastian [42]” universe, 
the theoretical freedom they were now supposed to enjoy in their “disintermediated” dialogue 
with their employers did not really turn to their advantage. At the same time, private welfare 
benefits, tied up to employee’s longevity in large publicly traded firms started to disappear with 
the obligation for corporations to be always more profitable and thus cut all expenses that did 
not contribute immediately to maximizing shareholders’ value (social benefits and personnel 
became the main adjustment variables). “Reengineering” and “rightsizing” also became 
leitmotivs with such consequences on employment that can be illustrated with the example of 
General Electric (GE) embracing the new philosophy under the guidance of shareholder 
defender Jack Welch [43], a CEO who, between 1981 and 2001 represented a very different 
spirit than that of stakeholder defender Ralph Cordiner, CEO of General Electric through the 
late 1950s. In the 1980s, a GE plant located at Erie (Pennsylvania) produced 350 locomotives 
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annually with around 7,500 employees; in 2000, it produced 911 locomotives annually with 
4,000 employees, and 3,500 jobs had been cut off. And overall, between 1981 (the year when 
Jack Welch became CEO) and 2001, GE’s number of employees has been cut from 400,000 to 
300,000. However, if, during that time, one included the employees belonging to the 1000 
corporations that GE acquired, the total employees cut reached 500 000. Such was Welch's 
reputation as a “right-sizer” that his employees nicknamed him “Neutron Jack”, referring to the 
massive destruction arms (if used, a neutron bomb would kill all people while buildings 
remained intact) [44]. With the arrival of J. Welch, GE was leaping into a new paradigm and a 
new era. The price of GE stock was all that mattered and became the only performance index; 
job creation stopped counting among stock-listed corporations' preoccupations. “Laying off 
employees”, “putting them in situations of precariousness […], these became signs of courage 
and proofs of sensible minds and also illustrated the end of “the mutual loyalty paradigm” [45]. 
Big investors, impressed by the American shareholder-value model, what with the U.S. 
economy and stock market booming and Europe and Japan lagging way behind came to several 
conclusion that they thought were linked: they believed firstly, that changes in corporate 
governance had produced the U.S. boom and that, in order for investors to reap vast benefits, 
European and Japanese companies could be persuaded to change similarly their governance 
practices and “get lean and mean” so as to become more profitable [46]; secondly, they held that 
greater corporate efficiency and a rising stock market would put an end to economic stagnation 
as it had in the U.S. Such was the faith in the shareholder value model that not only institutional 
investors, but also government officials, essayists and journalists, academics, did not hesitate 
to push the message aggressively in Japan and Europe in the 1980s.  
 
The scientific justification supporting the associated relevant new managerial practices was also 
manufactured in the USA, confirming CEOs that what they had to do was “right”. Actually, at 
the onset of the 1990s, MIT professor Michael Hammer, consulting firm CSC Index president 
James Champy [47], University of Texas professor Thomas Davenport made the development 
of “Business Process Reengineering (BPR)” a key leverage in the radical redesigning of 
corporate processes. If formerly, business process redesigning initiators had had much influence 
on revamping the organization and management of American firms such as Russell Ackoff, 
Eric Trist (the theorist of sociotechnical systems), Joseph Juran and W. Edwards Deming with 
“Total Quality Control (TQC)”, these changes had “invited people on the shop floor and in the 
back office to gradually improve their work together” [48]. However, “to the reengineers, there 
wasn't time for incremental change; the frenetic pace of the business environment demanded 
that managers adopt a 'blank sheet of paper', torpedo the old, wasteful, bureaucratic processes 
and redesign everything from scratch” [49]. The BPR movement, which involved a $50 billion 
consulting industry around 1994, led to waves of massive lay-offs within the largest US 
corporations and simultaneously, stock increases. As an example, companies like IBM, Sears, 
Xerox, US West, McDonnell  Douglas, RJR Nabisco and DuPont each cut from 4,500 to 60,000 
workers, registering first-day stock increases from 3.4 to 7.7 per cent [50] – a situation which 
pleased particularly their stock-invested CEOs and the consulting firms they hired to implement 
those cost- cutting operations. Even though, only eight years after they had crafted the word 
“Reengineering”, Hammer, Champy and Davenport all had issued public apologies [51], in the 
meantime "hundreds of companies had leapt onto the bandwagon of BPR [52]". And even though 
“everyone knew that the majority of the reengineering efforts did not do anything positive to 
the bottom line, to quality or customer service, the trend continued. It continued, according to 
them "even though everyone was partially aware that when you downsize, the older workers 
who are paid more get selected out and that those left often lack the institutional memory (as in 
the Alice stories) to operate the firm efficiently […]. The trend also continued because they had 
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a popular story line: Do not copy the Japanese system of TQM and Kaizen, be American and 
reinvent the corporation, stress individuality, cut the fat, and get rid of bureaucracy [53]”.  
 
In European major companies, and despite labor laws that made it theoretically more difficult 
to do, the privatization of State-owned companies in strategic sectors open to deregulation 
(under the pull of powerful industrial lobbies enjoying direct access to the European 
Commission) [54] opened the way to reengineering and rightsizing trends that produced massive 
layoffs. Firms like “ABB, Volkswagen, GM-Europe, British Telecom (BT), Lloyds TSB Bank, 
and many others were shedding tens of thousands of workers” [55]. Besides, public companies 
like Deutsche Telekom, following the lead of BT and preparing themselves to privatization, 
discarded their former employment policies. They stopped offering lifetime contracts to their 
employers and converted newcomers into contract workers. Laws passed in Germany, Italy, 
and France allowed privatizing companies to lay off civil servants motivating firms like 
Deutsche Telekom, Alitalia and France Telecom to take immediate advantage of these new 
freedoms despite the socialist label of most European governments. 
 
If the U.S. shareholder value model became the norm imposed by huge Anglo-Saxon 
institutional investors and was presented as a promise of constant growth, as Sanford Jacoby 
points out, "Unfortunately, the message was wishful thinking. The causal links between 
governance, productivity and growth are vague and unproven. Research […] shows that even 
the most basic elements of shareholder value governance – independent boards, small boards 
of directors, use of stock options - are not statistically associated with better corporate 
performance. In the wake of Enron, this should come as little surprise” [56]. One may also be 
founded to say that, with the host of huge corporate scandals that got into the open after Enron 
(Tyco, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Qwest, Xerox, etc.), and with the examples of 
shoddy corporate supervision practices in the banking sector as was revealed by the mammoth 
subprime crisis (2007-2008), but also, despite the loudly trumpeted commitment of G20 highest 
representatives to get rid of the crisis-related tax havens [57], the gradual disappearance of that 
issue from their agenda, the shareholder value model and its associated concept of “corporate 
governance” have amply proven that they were no guarantees for national growth or corporate 
transparency, but that on the contrary, because of the misdemeanors which their finance-driven 
logic generated among the actors behind their making, they had been the makers of a “bubble”, 
“casino” and “grand-theft” type of economics which endangered whole countries and their 
societies, all realities largely incompatible with any ambition of corporate social responsibility. 
 
CSR might appear as some kind of a “diversion” process which could tend to alleviate the 
perception of the genuine trend to question the “social model” set up in the age of “new 
paternalism” and “welfare state”, as the human costs of downsizing have been enormous. “As 
a result of the dislocations in the economy fueled in part by corporate restructuring and 
downsizing, median US family income declined by $1,400 (3.4 per cent) between 1989 and 
1995. This occurred despite the fact that the average American worker is working longer hours 
(3 per cent more for men and 35 per cent more for women in 1979-1994) and the proportion of 
families earning two incomes is increasing dramatically (from 31 per cent of families in 1967 
to 47 per cent in 1995). Individuals who lose their jobs to corporate restructuring pay a huge 
price. On average, according to the Economic Policy Institute's report The State of Working 
America, 1996-1997, workers who had lost their job were making 15 per cent less (if indeed 
they were employed) than they had earned at their previous places of work. About 25 per cent 
of these workers lost their health coverage as a result of job dislocation. Not surprisingly, job 
insecurity is on the rise among those still employed. Employee loyalty to employers has fallen 




From the 1970s onward, thanks to the political decisions made in the United States, then in 
Europe and Japan, which transformed the way private and public actors could finance their 
operations through capital markets – pension and mutual funds, banks and  insurance companies 
have, thanks to their asset managers, massively bought into the debt and equity of sovereign 
countries, their local governments and private stock listed corporations or banks. By the same 
token, heads of states, CEOs, governors and mayors have progressively been submitted to the 
constant pressure of the latter to offer always rising and faster or safer returns on their 
investments. Fund managers also imposed a new vision regarding economic activity and the 
role they expected to play in it. Trading huge blocks of assets on the stock exchanges of the 
most developed countries (on the NYSE, it means buying or selling 10,000 of shares), they also 
contributed to increase the exchanged volume of stock while reducing the average amount of 
time during which they kept them (for shares, it shrank from two years to eight months). Over 
thirty years, then, finance and finance-driven operations became the most rewarding sector of 
the economy for all white-collar professionals connected to it, whether in the industrial, 
banking, insurance or investment sectors. 
 
The cultural context of the 1980s and 1990s allowed those financialization-associated trends to 
become permanent fixtures of the new corporate game in the United States. Starting in the 
1980s, the mentality associated with the go-getting economy pulled by the Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher years, was clearly no more that of “moral contract paternalism” in corporate 
life but rather that of “a-moral individualism” where “cut-throat competition” and “winner-
take-all” were sanctified by the main media, leading academia in economics and business, 
political, corporate and banking circles. In order to capture the mood of these “roaring eighties”, 
one should quote the words of college-uneducated, then highly successful (before his demise 
for insider trading) and at the time very wealthy arbitrageur Ivan Boesky, who declared in front 
of an audience of UC Berkeley B. School's students, that “greed is all right by the way […]. I 
want you to know that I think greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about 
yourself” [59]. From that time on, the a-moral stance adopted by finance professionals in leading 
sectors of the American economy translated, according to James Stewart, into an unprecedented 
“crime wave” (1991) and by the late 1990, “conditions in much of the US corporate economy 
[…] had become 'criminogenic' in that they facilitated criminal behaviour” [60].From the 
Savings and Loans scam to the Junk Bonds then the New Economy scandals (Enron, Qwest, 
Global Crossing, etc.) to the subprime-induced banking crisis and the Madoff $60 billion rip-
off, the tight web of personal, business and government connections [61], plus the amount of 
financial resources lobbyists could use to discourage the vote or implementation of tighter 
corporate, banking or investment regulation – all these elements have made highly hypothetical, 
within the confines of “Turbocapitalism” or “Supercapitalism”, a return to the gentler age of 





In the history of America's industrialization process, everything was done to keep business in 
the driver's seat and thus align society's interests with business interests. From the start, business 
elites made sure that State and politics were made subservient to these interests. An interesting 
combination of political power interplays, “carrots and stick management”, associated with 
organizational change was largely responsible for that state of affairs. From “industrial 
paternalism” to “welfare capitalism” and  “Corporate  Social  Responsibility  (CSR Act I)” and 
despite a deceptive tentative to introduce a "welfare State" in America, all these concepts were 
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meant to allow the private sector to keep the initiative in organizing an institutional business 
environment and a social order that would be profitable to its leading political and business 
elites. If the economic translation of  the above-mentioned concepts was beneficial to correct 
the harshness of the 19th century industrialization process, then soften the deep social crisis 
born of the 1929 Wall Street crash and the Great Depression, if the adoption of the stakeholder 
model by major publicly traded US corporations was decisive in fostering a “contagion of 
prosperity” in the United States between the 1930s and 1960s, the financialization of corporate 
strategies born of the 1970s stagflation, monetary, oil and industrial crises, rapidly emptied 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR Act II) and Corporate Sustainable Development of any 
tangible meaning. “Reengineering”, “right-sizing” and “cost-cutting” practices adopted by 
profit- and stock- option driven CEOs in always shorter time spans under the constant 
supervision of domestic and world institutional investors, rendered corporate strategies often 
incompatible with the respect of their natural environment, international labor rules, the 
protection of human rights, anti-corruption practices and sound fiscal citizenship. As this 
incompatibility became more evident with a host of always bigger and direr corporate and 
banking scandals, the not questioning, by most academic CSR supporters of all these tangible 
phenomena, contributed to discredit both the CSR concept and later associated practices (Act 
II) and the ability of a-moral functioning large stock-listed corporations and their leadership, to 
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